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Abstract  
The study focused on Fiscal imbalance and its adverse effects on 
macroeconomic equilibrium in India have been receiving wide 
attention; the issue at States’ level has not so far been adequately 
analyzed. In many respects, fiscal situation in States is more critical 
than that at the Centre as States have the Constitutional 
responsibility for providing basic social and economic services, yet, 
do not have independent power to borrow from the market or the 
central bank. Given these constraints, the burden has tended to fall 
on capital and maintenance expenditures with adverse implications 
emphasizes the differences between fiscal sustainability analysis at 
the national and sub national levels, attempts to take into account 
uncertainty, and discusses the key components of the state’s fiscal 
accounts and how they respond to reforms and shocks. Risks to 
Tamil Nadu’s fiscal outlook include interest rate shocks, pressures on 
the primary balance, and contingent liabilities.  
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Introduction 
It is a fact that, the Centre, several States are also facing 
deteriorating budgetary positions, with serious implications on their 
developmental efforts. Insufficient revenue sources, uncontrolled 
growth of current expenditures, and failure of central transfers to 
grow as fast as the States’ own revenues have been the sources of 
the imbalances. In many respects, the fiscal situation in the States is 
more critical than that at the Centre as the States have the primary 
Constitutional responsibility for providing basic social and economic 
services. At the same time, while the elasticity of own revenues of 
the Centre and the States are broadly the same, the States’ 
expenditures have been growing at rates faster than that of the 
Centre particularly in recent years. There is not only a shrinking of 
capital expenditure, but the maintenance of existing capital assets is 
also not getting its due. Other signs are raising trend of non-
developmental consumption expenditure, high cost of government 
employees’ especially after the implementation of the Fifth Central 
Pay Commission. At the State level, there is an increasing trend in 
the volume in government employment thereby burgeoning rise in 
wages and salary bill apart from rise in debt servicing. From the 
receipts angle, poor tax collections, poorly targeted cost recovery 
policy and lack of desired tax reforms adversely affect the income 
buoyancy of the taxes that put constraints on expenditure needs 
from own revenue sources of the States. This leads to dependence 
on higher level governments for larger fiscal transfers and also on 
ways and means advances. Besides, public sector enterprises (PSEs) 
are largely in a financial mess requiring huge doses of budgetary 
support to sustain them. These are some of the worrisome factors 
among others. If the same fiscal trends follow, the fiscal deficit is 
likely to assume disquieting proportions due to an increasing 
component of revenue deficit to be financed from borrowings. 
Hence, there is need to strengthen the revenue-effort and 
restructuring of expenditure for sustainability. It is a tough challenge 
to all the governments. 
In the Indian federal set up, the States play an important role in 
accelerating and sustaining growth. Federal forms of government 
are a time-tested way of organising states. They are generally 
motivated by the need to accommodate territorially based 
ethnolinguistic and other socio-cultural diversities within a single 
political unit. There are also some fairly compelling economic 
arguments in favour of federalism. First, there can be substantial 
efficiency and welfare gains from decentralisation of spending 
responsibilities [Tiebout 1961; Musgrave 1969; Oates 1972]. 
Second, decentralisation can help ensure efficiency in the production 
of public goods. Decentralisation can act as a surrogate for market 
discipline in ensuring efficiency in the production of public goods 
 As our analysis would show, the rapidly rising fiscal deficit and debt 
levels in Tamil Nadu, and other Indian states, were troubling 
because the new borrowing over the period was used to finance 
revenue deficits crowding out fiscal space for infrastructure 
investment. The experience of Tamil Nadu in its quest for fiscal 
sustainability is relevant for sub national governments in other 
countries. Decentralization has given sub national governments in 
developing countries significant spending and taxation 
responsibilities, and the capacity to incur debt. Unsustainable fiscal 
policy at the sub national level jeopardizes service delivery, the 
safety of the national financial system, and macroeconomic stability. 
The paper is presents the analytic framework for fiscal balance 
analysis at the sub national level, and emphasizes the differences 
between sub national and national fiscal adjustments and discusses 
the fiscal deterioration in Tamil Nadu in the late 1990s and analyzes 
the key components of the state’s fiscal accounts. The section also 
discusses the outcomes of the fiscal reforms promoted in response 
to this deterioration. 
 
States’ own tax revenues 
States’ own taxes can be grouped into three parts, viz., (i) taxes on 
commodities and services such as sales tax, State excise, taxes on 
vehicles and taxes on goods and passengers, (ii) taxes on property 
and capital transactions such as stamps and registrations and land 
revenue, and (iii) taxes on income such as profession, trade and 
agricultural income. Among the above, the principal sources of 
States’ tax revenue are sales tax, State excise and stamps and 
registration fees. Sales tax alone accounts for nearly two-thirds of 
the total States’ own tax revenue. Realising the need for tax 
reforms, many States have switched over to a Value Added Tax 
(VAT) regime on the basis of the recommendations of the 
Empowered Committee of State Finance Ministers with effect from 
April 1, 2005. VAT may be defined as a tax on the value added at 
each stage of production and distribution of a commodity. 
 
India’s sub national borrowing regime and Tamil Nadu 
The Indian Constitution forbids states from borrowing abroad and 
requires them to obtain central permission for domestic borrowing. 
The central government places informal limits on states’ borrowing 
through the annual discussions with states on financing state 
development plans. While limiting explosive growth of state debt, 
the central government has not succeeded in preventing the states’ 
fiscal deterioration as indicated by high levels of debt and debt 
service over revenue in many states. Bargaining between the center 
and the states has often prompted the center to give additional 
loans or relax borrowing limits. Furthermore, since the late 1990s, 
many states have circumvented the borrowing limits by 
accumulating arrears or issuing guarantees to public enterprises’ 
market borrowing or newly-created special purpose vehicles.  
The state borrowing regime in India is complex. There are multiple 
borrowing channels each channel with its own rules. The states can 
obtain market financing, loans from the central government, and 
financing from employees’ provident fund although market 
borrowing, from the bond market, national small savings fund, and 
negotiated loans with public-sector financial institutions, has 
increased in importance, accounting for more than half of sub 
national borrowing, market discipline is absent. Market loans in India 
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are not pure market-based lending for two reasons. First, market 
loans are dominated by public commercial banks which have 
persistently exceeded the statutory requirement of holding 
government bonds, effectively crowding out private investment. 
Commercial banks’ holding of government securities grew from 14 
percent of combined liabilities of the consolidated government to 25 
percent between 1991 and 2004.Second, interest rates on 
government bonds are the same for all states independent of 
creditworthiness. States typically approach the market together, and 
the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) reportedly pushes creditors to buy a 
mix of state bonds with the better managed states subsidizing the 
worse-managing states. In 1999, RBI allowed market borrowing up 
to 35 percent of a state’s total market borrowing allocation. But in 
reality, state-specific auctions are declining not increasing (World 
Bank,2005b).
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The most important source of rising current expenditure has been 
wages and salaries. Fiscal reforms should aim at reducing the rate of 
growth of government employment to at least the same level as the 
rate of growth of population. Currently, the rate of growth of 
government employees’ in Tamil Nadu is over 3 percent per annum 
while population growth rate is just 1.37. The reforms will aim at 
bringing the current elasticity of government employment with 
respect to population from the existing 2.25 to unity. 
In recent years, that is, from 1993-94 onwards, however, the rate of 
growth has been only about 6 percent per annum. Under the reform 
scenario, the annual growth rate of subsidies is to be brought down 
to 1.3 percent so that the expenditure on subsidies grows exactly in 
tandem with the size of population. As regards transfers, over 70 
percent of current transfers other than subsidies and other transfers 
are grants to local bodies. Even so, compensation and assignments 
to local bodies formed less than 2 percent until 1996-97. The First 
State Finance Commission has recommended devolution of 8 
percent of State’s own tax revenues net of collection costs to local 
bodies for 1997-98, gradually increasing by one percent annually to 
12 percent in 2001-02. The reform scenario is worked out on the 
assumption that these recommendations will be adhered to. 
There is also a need to step up the operation and maintenance 
expenditure for replacement of aged and worn out assets 
particularly, in the irrigation and roads sectors. It is assumed that 
one of the reforms will be to see that the present low elasticity of 
operation and maintenance expenditure at around 0.62 will be 
gradually doubled by 2005-06. This will considerably reduce the 
spending gap in respect of maintenance of roads and bridges. 
On the revenue side, the buoyancy of the taxes on agricultural 
sector will be stepped up from the present 0.71 to unity level. As 
regards the commodity taxes (sales tax and state excise), without 
widening the base and adopting the VAT system applicable to goods 
as well as services, it may not be possible to raise more revenue. 
Revenue yield is likely to improve with the introduction of VAT 
because of improved transparency leading to better compliance. 
With these reforms, it is assumed that the commodity tax buoyancy 
will be raised up from 1.05 to 1.2. 
In view of the large and persistent resource gap, the cornerstone of 
the fiscal strategy pursued at State level needs to be examined as 
per the changing requirements. As rightly stated in the Mid Term 
Appraisal of the Tenth Five Year Plan 2002-07, Government of India, 
“Improving resources of States on a sustainable basis, providing 
incentives for developmental performance, fiscal prudence and 
accountability and putting in place successful and flexible 
mechanisms for intergovernmental transfer are key issues, not only 
in the remaining period of the Tenth Plan but even more for the 
Eleventh Plan”. Although the baseline points to a sustainable debt 
path for Tamil Nadu, there are significant risks that may derail the 
state’s progress along this path. Key risks are potential increases in 
real interest rates, constraints to primary balance adjustment, and 
sudden realization of contingent liabilities. 
Conclusion 
The present’s paper concluded sub national fiscal sustainability and 
applies it to the case of Tamil Nadu - an Indian state where fiscal 
adjustment has been ambitious and politically challenging, but has 
promised to put state finance on a sustainable path. The analysis 
suggests that the fiscal adjustment in Tamil Nadu has left fiscal 
space for increases in infrastructure investment which may be 
achieved without threatening fiscal sustainability. Though the fiscal 
management of Tamil Nadu seems comparatively better, yet there is 
scope for and need to strengthen its revenue-effort and 
restructuring of expenditure for sustainability. If the same fiscal 
trends follow, the fiscal deficit is likely to assume disquieting 
proportion due to increasing component of revenue deficit.  
Assessing fiscal sustainability is a complex task as it requires one to 
form a view about how much fiscal adjustment is politically and 
socially feasible in the future, and how the outstanding stocks of 
liabilities are going to evolve over time. These, in turn, depend on 
macroeconomic and financial market developments that are 
uncertain by nature. 
 
Policy measures towards states’ taxes   
The general approach of the States has been to rationalize and 
simplify the tax structure, broaden the tax base and impose 
moderate rates of taxation. States have initiated policy measures 
towards fiscal empowerment mainly through States own taxes and 
showed intention to increase the magnitude and efficiency of tax 
revenue mobilization over the years. 
 
Introduction of VAT 
Realizing the need for tax reforms, most of the States have switched 
over to a VAT regime on the basis of recommendations of the 
Empowered Committee of State Finance Ministers with effect from 
January 1, 2007. VAT may be defined as a tax on the value added at 
each stage of production and distribution of a commodity. VAT is 
inherently efficient than the sales tax or excise duty or any turnover 
tax. Operationally, application of VAT at a particular stage implies 
payment of tax by the producer or distributor on the value of his 
output but with a rebate (or credit) on the taxes paid by him on the 
inputs. 
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